


Wisconsin

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Institute

Report



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**Community-
Based Policing
in Wisconsin**

Can it Cut Crime?


Report from the President:

Very few people do not support the idea of having more police on the streets to prevent crime. The issue of community policing however, does not necessarily revolve around that idea. In this study, Professor John DiIulio of Princeton, one of the best known criminal researchers in the United States, examines this issue from a Wisconsin perspective. In doing this report, DiIulio organized a seminar on community policing at Princeton in 1992, attended by the top academic experts in the country. He also surveyed police chiefs throughout Wisconsin. His findings are very interesting.

There is no quantitative data indicating community policing has been effective throughout the country. Most of the stories are in fact, public relation efforts by local police departments to make themselves look good. Milwaukee is no different.

In 1992, violent crime climbed in Milwaukee 5.8%, yet the police department gives the impression things are going well. Not surprisingly, the Milwaukee Police Department was unwilling to release the number of police actually on the street at any given time, protecting citizens in Milwaukee. The fact is that very few police are ever on the streets in Milwaukee. Out of approximately 2,500 people in the police department, there is a possibility that no more than 123 uniform police are on the streets at any one time. That is a major issue.

What DiIulio is saying in this report is that if we really want to get some control over violent crime in our society, we need more police on the street. We have to hire more and spend more on policing, and make sure that they are physically out in our communities. That is the final message of this report. Without additional uniform police, the academic theories on community policing will fail.


James H. Miller

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Community-Based Policing in Wisconsin *Can it Cut Crime?*

by
John J. DiIulio, Jr., Ph.D.

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INTRODUCTION

Some criminologists argue that Americans are more likely to be assaulted, raped, robbed, burglarized, and murdered today than they were in the 1960s. Other criminologists argue that, except for residents of the nation's most economically depressed inner-city neighborhoods, rates of criminal victimization have fallen steadily over the last several decades. Likewise, some analysts contend that the chance that a criminal will go to prison has decreased, while others insist it has increased.

The general public, however, has little interest in these academic debates. Whatever the latest criminological wisdom, most Americans remain convinced crime is on the rise, the streets of the nation's cities are unsafe, and the justice system is failing to prevent and punish crime in a way that protects the public and its purse.¹ The title of the August 23, 1993, cover story of *Time* captured the public's fear: "America the Violent: Crime is Spreading and Patience is Running Out." And the title of the August 2, 1993, cover story of *U.S. News & World Report* captured the public's hope: "Super Cops." While many Americans have lost faith in the ability of prisons to rehabilitate criminals, they have not yet lost faith in the capacity of police to combat crime.

But what, if anything, can cops do to cut crime? What evidence is there to suggest changes in how police departments are led, organized, staffed, and operated can result in greater public safety, or at least less public fear of crime?

The consensus is that community-based policing (CBP) is the best organizational strategy for enhancing protection and decreasing fear of crime. But most leading analysts of CBP acknowledge at least three problems:

1. The evidence CBP reduces crime is anecdotal. Over a decade's worth of research has yet to demonstrate that, other things being equal, CBP reduces crime.
2. Various forms of CBP have been tried in numerous cities, big and small, all around the country. But no big-city police department has yet succeeded in fully implementing CBP.
3. CBP requires that more officers interact more closely and personally with more citizens. In many big-city police departments, however, the number of officers actually on the streets at any given time has remained only a tiny fraction of the total force.

Wisconsin has been the site of some of the most interesting experiments with CBP. The police department in Madison, Wisconsin, is widely viewed as a model of CBP in action. Over the last few years, efforts have been made to bring CBP to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In Milwaukee and other big-city jurisdictions wishing to continue experimenting with CBP, future efforts should:

1. Begin with *an operational definition of CBP in terms of personnel performance measures* used to evaluate street-level police officers.

¹ See the entries on public opinion about crime and punishment in Kathleen Maguire and Timothy J. Flanagan, eds., *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1991); W. G. Mayer, "Shifting Sands of Public Opinion," *The Public Interest*, Spring 1992, pp. 3-17.

2. Be undertaken only with *a commitment to expand the number of officers on patrol in high-crime neighborhoods* and in the areas adjacent to these places.

This report has three sections. The first section is a critical summary of what is known about CBP and other police-based strategies for combating crime. The second section offers an overview of two distinct policing traditions in Wisconsin. The third section offers an operational definition of CBP in relation to police performance measures and provides baseline data on crime rates and police manpower in Milwaukee.

This report was prepared in conjunction with Princeton University's Center of Domestic and Comparative Policy Studies. In the course of preparing this report, I enlisted the advice and assistance of Professor Mark H. Moore, Mr. Francis Hartmann, Dr. Mark Alan Hughes, and Dr. Marlon Boarnet. Also, I conducted a survey on community policing, to which some two dozen police chiefs and administrators all across Wisconsin responded; selected responses are quoted anonymously in section II. I am grateful for their help and consideration. The views expressed in this report are mine alone and should not be attributed to any of the persons or institutions consulted or cited by me in this report.

I. WHAT IS COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING?

In academic studies and popular commentary, CBP is normally defined as the antithesis of "traditional" or "911" policing, in which police officers are organized along paramilitary lines, spend countless hours cruising in patrol cars, and get evaluated mainly according to such performance criteria as how quickly they respond to radio-dispatched calls, how many arrests they make, or how many tickets they issue. In this ostensibly outdated model of policing, there is only incidental interaction between police and community residents. Organizationally, such policing is criticized as a high-technology, bureaucratic game of "cops and robbers," in which police remain physically and psychologically distant from the people of the communities they protect and serve and are "never around" when needed.

In contrast, the prototypical characteristics of community policing are said to be the use of participative management teams cutting across ranks (captains consult with junior officers) or functional specialties (plainclothes vice officers work with uniformed officers), police patrol on foot as well as in cars, and personnel evaluation measures that induce police to listen to community residents, work with community leaders, coordinate problem-solving activities with other government agencies,² and use their law-enforcement authority in ways citizens understand and approve. CBP promises to transform policing from a fruitless game of "cops and robbers" to a fruitful game of "cops and citizens."

Even to the casual observer of what police do and how they do it, however, the foregoing contrast between the conventional model of policing and CBP should ring rather hollow. It idealizes the latter at the expense of the former. It contrasts the worst realities of conventional policing with the fondest hopes for CBP. And it ignores the fact that, long before anyone talked or wrote about CBP, police officers in many jurisdictions, big and small, interacted closely with citizens, solved complicated problems, worked in teams, and performed both order-maintenance and social service functions. Indeed, long before CBP enthusiasts argued for a return to foot patrol, there was -- foot patrol! To date, CBP has been four-fifths rhetoric, one-fifth reality.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suppose CBP is little more than a sham concept beckoning police officers to become mere community kibitzers or social workers with badges. The best of CBP advocates have long recognized that, when all is said and done, police officers must be trained and authorized to figure out ways of preventing crime, detecting and arresting persons suspected of committing crimes, and using such force (including deadly force) as may be necessary and proper to apprehend would-be criminals. In short, they have acknowledged that, while CBP may involve new ways of organizing police work, it does not involve, and ought not to involve, a fundamental change in the nature of police work. One of the first and finest proponents of CBP, James Q. Wilson, offers the following characterization of CBP:

[It is] a law enforcement philosophy that tries to do two things -- bring police officers and citizens into working partnerships in neighborhoods and give the police responsibility for identifying and solving problems even if they are not conventional law enforcement issues. For [CBP] to work patrol officers and sergeants must be given greater freedom

² Some analysts prefer the term problem-oriented policing (POP) to CBP. Though the distinction between POP and CBP seems meaningful to analysts, and has given rise to various debates and controversies among the academic cognoscenti, it is, practically speaking, a distinction without a difference.

from radio dispatchers and standardized duty schedules and evaluated on grounds other than arrests made or tickets issued.³

Properly understood, therefore, CBP is an effort to do better what police have always done, namely, protect and serve the public. CBP is an attempt to do this by changing the way police departments, large and small, are led, organized, staffed, and operated. Despite well over a decade's worth of research and practical experimentation, whether CBP-oriented changes in police organizations can be made with predictable and desirable consequences (less crime, less citizen fear of crime, better community-police relations, improved police morale) remains an open question.⁴

Using Cops to Cut Crime: Nothing Works?

Until the 1980s, the academic research on policing and the experiences of most police administrators cast grave doubts on CBP and other police-based strategies for cutting crime or reducing fear of crime. The most famous experiment was the preventive-patrol study conducted in Kansas City, Missouri.⁵ For a year, the city was divided into three areas, each of which received a different level of patrolling. To the surprise of many, criminal activity, reported crime, rates of victimization as measured in a follow-up survey, citizen fear, and citizen satisfaction with the police were all about the same in these areas. Active auto patrol -- beats where cars were visible cruising the streets two to three times more frequently than in the control areas -- made no difference at all.

To some, the Kansas City experiment suggested that, when it comes to using cops to cut crime, "nothing works." But it was not long before a new generation of studies argued that, while mere increases in auto patrol mattered little, good things seemed to happen wherever police got out of their cars, onto the streets, and into regular contact and communications with the people in the community. Many interpreted these studies to show that, under some conditions, some type of CBP could cut street crime, check the public's fear of crime, strengthen officers' morale, and heal rifts between the police and the community.⁶

³ James Q. Wilson, "Can the Bureaucracy Be Deregulated?," in John J. DiIulio, Jr., ed., *Deregulating the Public Service: Can Government Be Improved?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming January 1994), ch. 3, draft, p. 21.

⁴ The next parts of this section are drawn from two larger studies of crime and urban policy; see John J. DiIulio, Jr., "Crime," in Henry J. Aaron and Charles L. Schultze, eds., *Setting Domestic Priorities: What Can Government Do?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1992), ch. 4, especially pp. 136-141; John J. DiIulio, Jr. and Mark Alan Hughes, *Protection and Connection: A Mobility Strategy for Saving the Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).

⁵ George L. Kelling and others, *The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Technical Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974); George L. Kelling, *What Works -- Research and the Police* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, Crime File Series, undated).

⁶ This post-Kansas City literature is vast. For a representative sample of this literature, see James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, "The Effect of the Police on Crime," *Law and Society Review*, vol. 12 (Spring 1978), pp. 367-90; Herman Goldstein, "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach," *Journal of Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 25 (April 1979), pp. 236-58; Jack Greene and Stephen Mastrofski, eds., *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality?* (Praeger, 1988); Robert C. Trajanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective* (Anderson, 1990); Hans Toch and J. Douglas Grant, *Police as Problem Solvers* (Plenum Press, 1991). See also the series of monographs produced under the direction of Mark H. Moore of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, *Perspectives on Policing* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, June and November 1988), especially nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, these studies became the underlying social-scientific justification for CBP initiatives in New York City, Houston, Milwaukee, and many other cities around the country. There are at least four general points to be made about our experiences with CBP to date.

First, CBP was not the brainchild of any one academic analyst or police chief. The idea had been around in one form or another since the 1967 report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which called "for the creation of a new kind of police officer."⁷

Second, there is no reason to suppose CBP, or any other form of policing, works better when officers have college diplomas or advanced degrees. Over the last decade, federal bills to advance CBP have often been coupled with efforts to attract recent college graduates or student-interns into a "police corps." But from the 1978 study by the National Academy on Higher Education for Police Officers to the present, absolutely no evidence has been found to support the idea that college-degree holders make better police officers.⁸ In 1990, about 90% of all police departments required new officer recruits to have a high-school diploma; few required a four-year college degree.⁹ There is no compelling evidence to suggest formal education standards need to be raised.

Third, in the absence of concrete evidence on the benefits of CBP, the strongest advocates of CBP remain the police chiefs who have launched it, the officers who have been promoted within it, the academics who have studied it, and the journalists who have reported and commented on it. In the words of one analyst, CBP advocates have turned the idea into "mom and apple pie."¹⁰

Fourth and finally, many analysts had hoped the efficacy of CBP would be tested by the Intensive Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (INOP) project launched in 1990 by the National Institute of Justice. The INOP project was designed to advance CBP by redirecting "police and community resources toward resolving underlying problems that breed crime and drug abuse in a community."¹¹ Under the terms of the project, the federal government funded CBP initiatives in eight communities, and a second INOP project focusing on eight rural communities was planned. Like previous evaluation efforts, however, the INOP project fell short on methodological and other grounds.

Thus, there remains no body of systematic evaluations of CBP in relation to crime rates, citizens' fear of crime, police morale, or police-community relations.

⁷ President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 97-103.

⁸ Lawrence W. Sherman, *The Quality of Police Education* (Jossey-Bass, 1978).

⁹ Brian A. Reaves, *State and Local Police Departments, 1990* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1992), p. 6.

¹⁰ John Eck, Police Executive Research Forum, *quoted in* Gordon Witkin, "Beyond 'Just the facts, ma'am': Community Policing Is Law Enforcement's Hottest New Idea, But It's Promise Is Elusive," *U.S. News & World Report*, August 3, 1993, p. 28.

¹¹ United States Department of Justice, *Evaluation Plan: 1991* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1991), pp. 19-24, at p. 22.

Saturation Policing, Community-Based Policing, or Both?

In the 1980s, as the inner-city drug-and-crime problem expanded, many big-city police forces contracted. Between 1977 and 1987, the number of officers per 1,000 resident population in 59 big-city police departments fell from 2.4 to 2.3, and the total number of officers dropped in 15 of the 50 largest cities.¹² By 1991, hardly a major police force in the country had enough officers to greatly increase the number of officers on foot patrol in its worst neighborhoods. Even if more cops were on tap during the 1980s, however, it is by no means clear deploying them in high-crime areas would have made a major and positive difference. Two leading analysts of policing concluded some inner-city neighborhoods had become "so demoralized and crime-ridden as to make foot patrol useless."¹³

The fact is, however, that no experiments have been done to test the effects of increasing the number of officers on foot patrol in crime-ridden, inner-city neighborhoods. It is known police crackdowns -- brief, intensive deployments in targeted areas resulting in far higher than average arrest rates -- rarely succeed in reducing crime, in part because criminals quickly move to other, often nearby, locations.¹⁴ But we still do not know what would happen if there were, in effect, no place left for the criminals to go (save into the back of a police wagon).

We do not know what, if any, effects "saturation policing" -- doubling, tripling, or quadrupling the number of officers on regular duty (foot patrol and auto patrol) in and around drug-infested, crime-torn neighborhoods -- would have on crime rates or citizens' fear of crime. And we do not know what, if any, difference, it would make if saturation policing were combined with CBP, that is, if the extra officers were trained, deployed, and operated on the basis of CBP precepts.

It is at least conceivable saturation policing, with or without CBP, could exert some significant downward pressure on crime. Even in the heyday of the aforementioned Kansas City experiment and other studies raising doubts about the relationship between the numbers of police and crime rates, no one was heard demanding reductions in police protection for the places where they lived and worked.

Consider the case of the United States Congress. Our senators and representatives clearly value hefty police manpower -- for themselves. In the late 1980s, when 3,855 police officers protected all the other citizens of Washington, Congress had a force of 1,200 just to patrol Capitol Hill.¹⁵ Meanwhile, all over the country, citizens and businesses able to afford to invest in private security personnel and systems have done so.

¹² Maguire and Flanagan, *Sourcebook*, *supra* note 1, pp. 35, 46.

¹³ James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982, p. 38.

¹⁴ Lawrence W. Sherman, *Police Crackdowns* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice Reports, March/April 1990).

¹⁵ John J. DiIulio, Jr., "And Don't Blame the D.C. Police," *The Washington Post*, April 3, 1991, p. A31.

But for the nation's poor citizens trapped in high-crime, urban neighborhoods and public-housing projects, private security measures are unaffordable "luxuries." These disadvantaged citizens rely, as they must, on the police.

Target-Hardening Plus Wall-to-Wall Policing?

There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest CBP, in conjunction with efforts at "target-hardening" -- physical designs and crime-awareness measures that make a given environment (a home, a school, a convenience store, a shopping mall) relatively impervious to crime -- can make a positive difference. For example, a few years ago, the number of convenience store robberies in Gainesville, Florida, rose sharply. The Gainesville Police Department conducted an analysis revealing the number and location of store clerks, lighting levels, cash-handling procedures, and other factors affected the rate at which convenience stores were robbed. Gainesville adopted ordinances requiring convenience stores to have a second clerk on duty during overnight hours and other, related security measures. Robberies fell about 65%.¹⁶

This tale and others like it have given CBP enthusiasts reason enough to suppose target-hardening creativity on the part of police, rather than a sharp increase in the number of police or "wall-to-wall policing," is the surest path to cutting crime and easing citizens' fear of crime.

In the absence of systematic evidence, it is difficult to know what to make of this proposition. But one thing seems clear: Most of the nation's crime-torn, inner-city neighborhoods are anything but target-hardened. Indeed, many people who live in inner-city public housing live without doors that lock, have no burglar alarms, walk dimly lit streets, and lack most other environmental-design amenities that might help reduce their risk of being victimized.

Many proposals have been made to target-harden inner-city neighborhoods -- erecting concrete barriers on streets frequented by drug dealers and their car-bound buyers, automatically evicting persons in trouble with the law from public housing, having police assigned to shadow and harass suspected drug dealers. But these proposals normally meet stiff resistance, from civil liberties lawyers if not from the residents of these communities themselves.¹⁷

As Charleston Police Chief Reuben Greenberg has observed, the aim of an equitable criminal-justice policy should be to give poor, inner-city citizens the same sort of protection people who live "in a country club or an upscale apartment" can afford for themselves.¹⁸ But such measures have been taken in very few neighborhoods where they would seem to be most needed.

¹⁶ Sherry Plaster and Stan Carter, *Planning for Prevention* (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 1993), p. ii. The empirical literature on CBP consists of little more than such anecdotes. For example, see Trajanowicz and Bucqueroux, *Community Policing*, *supra* note 6. In the famous quip of the political scientist Raymond Wolfinger, "the plural of anecdote is data." But it is a mistake to think such anecdotes amount to meaningful scientific analyses of what, if any, impact CBP has on crime.

¹⁷ In at least some cases, civil liberties lawyers have joined with community residents in supporting such measures; for example, see Rocelle L. Stanfield, "Safe Passage," *National Journal*, September 25, 1993, pp. 2035-38.

¹⁸ Reuben M. Greenberg, "Less Bang-Bang for the Buck," *Policy Review*, vol. 59 (Winter 1992), p. 60.

Thus, whatever the efficacy of target-hardening measures, and whatever the potential benefits of CBP, it is hard to suppose crime can be cut in places where people are unable to afford private security services and systems unless there is a sufficient public investment in policing. In short, in poor neighborhoods where there are, in effect, too few cops chasing too many criminals, no one should be surprised to see crime increase.

What Would More Cops Cost, and Is It Worth It?

At the same time, however, no one should be deluded into believing cops come cheap. For instance, the federal crime bill that, as of this writing, is pending before Congress calls for 100,000 more officers. But this translates into only a fraction of that number of officers on the streets at any given time.

Indeed, David Bayley has analyzed police expenditure and deployment patterns and concluded to put one new officer on the street around the clock, at least 10 new officers must be hired.¹⁹ His "10-for-1" rule is derived from the following assumptions: (1) 65% of the nation's police officers are assigned to uniformed patrol; (2) it takes an estimated 5.5 officers to provide one officer around the clock throughout the year; and, (3) only about one of every 5.5 officers assigned to uniformed duties will be available at any given time -- 11.8% of total strength. And given that a patrol officer costs, on average, about \$50,000 a year, he concludes that given "the 10-for-1 rule the cost of one more street officer is really \$500,000."²⁰

Bayley's 10-to-1 rule and cost estimates may be somewhat inflated (in many mid-sized departments, more than 65% of officers are not on desk jobs, more than one in 5.5 officers assigned to uniformed duties are available at any given time, and annual operating costs per officer nationally are closer to \$30,000 than to \$50,000). But the reality probably lies somewhere between a 5-to-1 rule and his 10-to-1 rule. Using a 5-to-1 rule and assuming a \$30,000 per-year, per-officer cost, the lower-bound estimate is that each around-the-clock cop would cost \$150,000.

Does spending \$150,000 or even \$500,000 to put an officer on the street around the clock and throughout the year represent a wise social investment? The answer depends on one's perspective on current spending for police and other justice activities, and one's faith in the prospect that more cops could spell less crime and less neighborhood disintegration caused by crime.

Today, the federal government spends about a penny of every federal dollar on *all* justice activities -- law enforcement, courts, corrections. State and local governments together spend about two cents of every dollar on all justice activities. Given the salience of crime in every survey of public priorities, the view that "ensuring domestic tranquillity" is a central function of government, and the untested possibility that more cops, with or without CBP, might spell less crime, increasing, even doubling, government expenditures on policing would not seem like such an outlandish thing to contemplate. On the other hand, given that most criminologists are convinced more cops does not spell less crime, even small increases in government expenditures on policing would seem hard to justify on rational grounds.

¹⁹ David Bayley, "The Cop Fallacy," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1993, p. A17.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

As Table 1 below shows, in 1990, Wisconsin spent less per capita than the national average on all justice activities save one: public defense of accused criminals. In 1990, Wisconsin spent about \$1 billion on all justice-system activities, roughly half of it on state and local police.²¹ Crudely put, to double what Wisconsin spends on policing would mean a 50% increase in its total justice-system spending.

TABLE 1 State and Local Justice-System Spending Per Capita, 1990

	TOTAL	Police	Courts	Prosecution	Defense	Corrections	Other
National	\$261	\$112	\$31	\$16	\$5	\$95	\$2
Wisconsin	\$209	\$101	\$23	\$14	\$7	\$63	\$.50

Source: Adapted from Kathleen Maguire and Timothy J. Flanagan, *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1991* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992), p. 5

Using Bayley's estimates, spending an additional \$500 million on police would put 1,000 additional cops on the street around the clock. Using the 5-to-1 rather than the 10-to-1 rule and the lower cost estimates, the same spending increase would place about 3,300 additional cops on the street around the clock. It is impossible to know what would happen if even 1,000 officers were added to the streets of Wisconsin's high-crime areas. It is hard to imagine saturation policing on this scale, with or without CBP, would exert no downward pressure on crime rates. Whether it would, under any conditions, cut crime rates by enough to justify the expenditure, however, is the multi-million dollar question to which there can be, at present, no conclusive answer.

²¹ Maguire and Flanagan, *Sourcebook*, *supra* note 1, p. 4.

II. POLICING IN WISCONSIN: TWO DISTINCT TRADITIONS

The history of policing in Wisconsin can be thought of as a history of decisions about political control of the police.²² Traditionally, the state has isolated its police from political control. Police chiefs in Wisconsin have enjoyed life tenure. But political insulation has its vices as well as its virtues. As Milwaukee District Attorney E. Michael McCann once stated, "Chiefs here not only resist bad political pressure, but good political pressure."²³

The City of Milwaukee established a full-time police force in 1855. Like many police departments of the day, it was riddled with political patronage. Reform-minded citizens urged the state legislature to establish a four-person fire and police commission as a means of wrenching the police and fire departments from political control.

In 1885, the first Fire and Police Commission was established in Milwaukee by an amendment to the city's charter. The commission had the power to appoint the police and fire chiefs, approve appointments and promotions in the departments, and review disciplinary actions taken against department personnel. In 1897, the state legislature extended the use of commissions to other cities in Wisconsin. In 1911, the powers of the commission were expanded to include hearing complaints brought by property owners. In practice, however, the commissions remained rather weak bodies, and political pressures continued to govern how the departments ran. The commissions remained weak until strengthened by legislation in the 1970s.

The power vacuum created by weak commissions was often filled by strong police chiefs. With life tenure, the chiefs often knew they would outlast most elected officials. Many departments became creatures of their chiefs. There is no better example than the modern Milwaukee police department.

The modern Milwaukee police department was shaped by the tenure of Harold Breier, its chief from 1964 to 1984. Though popular in the city's white neighborhoods, Breier's tenure was punctuated by tensions with the city's minority communities. The falling-out between Breier and the African-American community dates at least from the Milwaukee riots of 1967. Breier was accused of ordering heavy-handed tactics to control the rioters and restore order.

Far from anything resembling CBP, Breier's police department was a paradigm of traditional policing organization and methods. He ran his force like a military organization, with officers required to salute the chief, strict standards for uniforms, and an emphasis on discipline and authority. He tolerated little in the way of outside influences or control. For example, in the 1970s, the Milwaukee Common Council passed an ordinance requiring police officers to wear cloth identification patches so citizens could identify officers by badge number. Breier refused to implement the ordinance. When a citizen died in police custody in 1981, Breier publicly exonerated the officers involved before the coroner had ruled on a cause of death.²⁴ According to a

²² This discussion is drawn largely from the unpublished background paper, "Policing in Wisconsin," prepared for this report by Dr. Marlon G. Boamet.

²³ Quoted in John J. McCarthy, "Harold Breier: Imperious, Old-Fashioned, and Chief For Life," *Police Magazine*, November 1981, p. 29.

²⁴ Rick Romell, "Furor in Dahmer Tragedy Echoes '81 Lacy Case," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, August 12, 1991, pp. 1A, 4A.

reporter who covered city hall, in a tense meeting with black ministers, Breier's parting shot was, "I don't tell you how to run your churches. Don't tell me how to run my police department."²⁵ More recently, Breier said "I heard there was a gay activist talking to the police about sensitivity to gays. I guarantee you, I wouldn't have let him through the door."²⁶

In short, apart from Philadelphia's former police chief (and later mayor) Frank L. Rizzo,²⁷ Breier dominated a major police department the way no other big-city police chief did in the 1960s and 70s. Breier's domination apparently was the impetus for a 1978 law that strengthened the power of the Fire and Police Commissions and allowed municipalities to limit the terms of police chiefs. Milwaukee chose, at that time, to impose a seven-year term limit on future chiefs, but it did not apply this rule to Breier.

Robert Ziarnik was appointed to replace Breier. Ziarnik had been Breier's number-two man until 1983. He began to open up the department's activities to outside review. He also met with leaders of the minority community in an attempt to make the department more responsive to their concerns. When Ziarnik resigned in 1989, the Fire and Police Commission conducted a nationwide search for a successor. The search resulted in the first chief appointed from outside the department, Philip Arreola.

In marked contrast to Breier, Arreola entered the chief's office as a staunch advocate of CBP, and a strong critic of traditional police organization and methods. In 1991, the department issued a study endorsing CBP techniques and offering preliminary suggestions for implementing them.²⁸ A mayoral commission headed by Marquette University President Father Albert J. DiUlio recommended the department forge ahead with CBP, claiming CBP could help improve police-community relations and giving the concept a ringing endorsement.²⁹

But it was not long before resistance to Arreola's CBP ambitions began to mount from inside the police department still bearing, despite Ziarnik's changes, Breier's organizational stamp. Newspaper stories with headlines like "Not Everyone Sold On Community Policing" greeted Arreola's CBP initiative.³⁰ In September of 1991, one local paper reported a poll conducted by Milwaukee's police union found 93% of the membership (roughly 79% of the officers) lacking confidence in Arreola's ability to run the department.³¹ The next month, another local paper surveyed Milwaukee police

²⁵ Calvin S. Holm (Letter to the Editor), "Look at Breier's History," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, September 4, 1991, p. 8A.

²⁶ Katherine M. Skiba, "80 and Full of Fire," *The Milwaukee Journal*, August 29, 1991, pp. 1, 14.

²⁷ For an accurate account of Rizzo's career, see S. A. Paolantonio, *Rizzo: The Last Big Man in Big City America* (Camino, 1993).

²⁸ *Policing in the Nineties: A Study of the Management and Operations of the Milwaukee Department*, Milwaukee Police Department, August 1991.

²⁹ Leonard Sykes, Jr., "Mayoral Panel Urges Quick Start for Community-Based Policing," *The Milwaukee Journal*, October 15, 1991, pp. 1, 4.

³⁰ Heidi Reuter, *Milwaukee Sentinel*, November 21, 1991, pp. 1A, 8A.

³¹ Tom Held, "93% Lack Confidence, Poll Says," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, August 8, 1991, pp. 1A, 15A.

officers on how best to combat crime. The paper received completed questionnaires from 584 Milwaukee police officers out of some 1,871.³² Even though the results of this survey could in no way be taken as a representative sample of opinion throughout the department, the results could give Arreola and other CBP enthusiasts little comfort. In sum, 86% of the officers said hiring a new police chief would help to control crime, while 53% said CBP would not help to control crime.³³ And 91% said they believed Milwaukee would be more dangerous in 1996 than it was in 1991.³⁴

It is certainly possible CBP-oriented changes, major and cosmetic, can be made despite this rocky start. And, indeed, many who have observed and lived through the initiative believe such changes have been made, and are still underway.

But as Harvard University Professor Mark H. Moore has emphasized, even under optimal political and administrative conditions, the transition to CBP can be difficult.³⁵ Where labor-management relations have been troubled, and where CBP has gone from being a managerial innovation to a political football, there is little reason to suppose it can work. Milwaukee's early experience with CBP, however, are by no means atypical. Many other big-city police departments that have introduced CBP have experienced similar administrative growing pains.³⁶

Just as Breier shaped the Milwaukee police force in ways making it tough terrain for CBP, so did Madison police chief David Couper shape his department in ways making it a model of CBP in action.

Couper was appointed Madison Police Chief in 1972 and remained in office into the 1990s. Couper has been described as an unusually progressive chief. Early on in his career as chief, he established guidelines for the use of force. He also established a special unit trained in conflict management to handle the anti-war demonstrations often occurring at the University of Wisconsin at Madison in the early 1970s. Couper has stated that the purpose of the unit was to help the Madison police shed the old role of enforcer and take on a new role as peacemaker.³⁷

In 1986, Couper spearheaded a CBP-oriented effort under the auspices of the Experimental Police District (EPD). One of the mission statements of the EPD stated, "Formal ranks of a paramilitary hierarchy will be replaced by a more egalitarian style of management..."³⁸ Thirty-eight department employees were assigned to the EPD and

32 Anne Bothwell, "Tougher Approach Needed to Throttle Crime, Officers Say," *The Milwaukee Journal*, September 23, 1991, pp. 1, 8.

33 *Ibid.*

34 *Ibid.*

35 Mark H. Moore, "Community-Based Policing: Is Deregulation the Missing Link?," in DiIulio, ed., *Deregulating the Public Service*, *supra* note 3; interviews with Professor Moore.

36 I am grateful to Professor David H. Bayley for reinforcing this point with me.

37 David C. Couper and Sabine H. Lobitz, *Quality Policing: the Madison Experience*, Police Executive Research Forum Discussion Paper, 1991, p. 15.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

permitted to choose their own leadership team. Before the district began to function, the officers held meetings with local community and business leaders.

While the EPD was being planned, Couper began to survey what he has termed the department's "citizen-customers."³⁹ Beginning in 1987, every 50th case handled by the department was selected to be a part of the survey. All individuals identified in a selected case (victims, witnesses, complainants, and arrestees) received a survey form asking them to evaluate the quality of service provided by the Madison police. Couper personally read all survey responses (on the order of 160 surveys were mailed each month, and about 40% were returned); summary reports were printed periodically in the department's newsletter.⁴⁰

Wisconsin is thus home to two very different models of policing, embodied in two very different long-time leaders, Breier and Couper. Couper represents CBP; Breier and those officers in Milwaukee who continue to reflect his influence represent the more traditional, command-and-control style of policing. Couper has argued for CBP-oriented changes as ways of recognizing "the value of employee input" and overcoming the "chilling restraint on creativity" that more traditional models of policing entail.⁴¹ Breier had this to say about CBP: "You can take community policing and stick it in your ear. There's no substitute for strong law enforcement. First, a police officer doesn't have the training to take care of all the social ills of the city. And second, he should be so busy maintaining law and order that he doesn't have time for that crap."⁴²

CBP in Wisconsin: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

As noted in section I. of this report, there is no systematic evidence enabling one to choose between these two starkly different views of CBP with respect to such ends as crime control, reductions in citizens' fear of crime, police-community relations, or police morale. But there can be no question many, if not most, police chiefs in Wisconsin endorse the concept of CBP, even though they define the concept in myriad ways.

Some two dozen police chiefs all across Wisconsin responded to a survey that asked them their views on a wide range of issues related to CBP. Based on a content analysis of their responses, below are the questions in the survey and three representative answers to each question.⁴³

39 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

42 *Quoted in Skiba, "80 and Full of Fire," supra note 26.*

43 Representative, that is, of most answers given to the questions, *i.e.*, typical responses. The sample responses given are drawn from 15 different chiefs or administrators. This was not intended as a scientific survey of any sort. Rather, it was intended merely to get some impression of how various police chiefs in Wisconsin felt about the idea of CBP. Also, the material excerpted is not typical of the length of the answers. Some chiefs wrote pages in response to each question; others penned only a few lines. I cite the answers here as they were worded by those who wrote them, with no compositional corrections.

1. Does the concept embody a caricature of earlier forms of policing? In particular, does it make a straw man of what has been variously labeled "command-and-control," "traditional," "professional," "reactive," and "911" policing?

Community policing...is simply returning to the basics of having officers interact and become more familiar with the community that they are policing, and providing those citizens with expertise in policing themselves, and in securing resources to improve the community that they live in.

I do believe that COP⁴⁴ uses some earlier forms of policing and I have heard comments from others that COP is just another name for processes that have been used in the past.... (But COP) organizes the processes, and makes the public more aware of the existence of what is happening.... Each department has its own concept....

Community policing is a melting pot of a lot of different concepts, taking some of the good parts and weeding out the bad parts while incorporating new concepts.

2. What is the best way to operationalize the definition of community policing? Can it be operationalized, or must we simply "know it when we see it"? How many major U.S. cities now have community policing, and where has the concept been implemented most fully?

The best way to operationalize it is to have your officers buy into the idea in keeping with the mission and values of the department. A committee structure of community members and police should promote programs like neighborhood watch, school liason [sic] officers...and many more programs that involve teamwork with police and their community. Small cities like ours have been practicing community policing long before it became the "buzzword" of the 90s. Lee Brown [the former chief of New York and Houston police departments] probably has promoted it most effectively in large cities.

I believe community-based policing is unique to each city.... At this point, I have no knowledge as to the number of cities that have community-based policing.

It doesn't seem like a good definition of community policing has ever been established or ever will. Most communities have specific needs which deviate from a standard definition.

3. What is the state of empirical evidence on the consequences of community policing? Is there any systematic research demonstrating that, other things being equal (or as "equal" as they get in the real world), community policing works better than other administratively distinct forms of policing in relation to crime prevention and control? How safe citizens feel? The quality of police-community relations? Is there any evidence about the cost-effectiveness of community policing?

For all the publicity and attention given to community policing, there appears to be very little empirical evidence available. What we do find are numerous articles dealing with specific programs that on face value have had a positive impact on a community.... [B]what we do not see are tangible, statistical relationships between community policing efforts and the level of crime or complaints generated in those communities.... Something must be done to separate perception from fact.

⁴⁴ This respondent used COP, for "community-oriented policing," rather than CBP. Some other respondents did the same.

Information's not available to me. My only comment would be a personal opinion. Citizens may feel safer. Community relations may improve. Programs would have a higher cost.

For decades the police profession, its realistic goals and objectives and operating procedures, have been concealed from the general public.... Once the citizen becomes involved, the feeling or perception of greater safety will result. I am not aware of any cost effective studies concerning community policing.

4. What are the major stumbling blocks in implementing and sustaining community policing? Under what political, legal, administrative, and budgetary conditions does it fly (or crash)? What, if any, strategic leadership and management approaches sustain (or starve) it over time?

The police profession as a whole has been resistant to change.... It is also not uncommon for police executives to declare a change only to find that in time the organization returns to former methods of operation. Most proponents of community policing advance their cause with missionary zeal. Little attention has been given to more moderate or gradual implementation strategies.

Community policing requires more manpower per capita.

In order for it to be effective the entire Police Department must accept the COP philosophy. Also, both private and city agencies must be involved in the formation of COP.... COP forces the officer out of his/her patrol car and into a walking assignment. This is an added cost factor.... This means possible hiring of additional officers to augment COP.

5. What, if any, ethical problems are posed by community policing? How, if at all, do these problems differ from the ethical challenges faced by persons who work in "traditional" police departments?

The ethical problems with the program are that it is difficult to write down a standard set of guidelines or rules that apply to every situation.

When working in a COP program, officers become "close" to the public that they are working with. There is always the chance that "favors" may be asked on both sides.... In this respect it is not much different than the "traditional" policing practices as the "cop on the beat" where the officer is also "close" to those he encounters....

I can't envision any ethical problems as a result of community policing as opposed to traditional police operations.... The ethical standards in the State of Wisconsin are considered exemplary....

III. THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING

Like police chiefs in most places, therefore, it would seem the consensus view among the Wisconsin chiefs responding to the survey is that CBP is an idea whose time has come. But as is equally clear from their responses, CBP means different things to different police administrators, and few presume to know whether it makes any demonstrable difference in crime rates of other usual measures of police performance.

Still, if there is a police-based strategy that may reduce crime and disorder, CBP is probably it. There are, however, at least two things that must be done if CBP is to have a meaningful chance to prove itself, especially in big-city jurisdictions with high-crime neighborhoods such as Milwaukee:

1. *CBP should be operationalized in terms of how the day-to-day work of police officers is evaluated.*
2. *CBP should be undertaken with a commitment to increase manpower as necessary.*

CBP: Measuring Police Performance

If there is a meaningful and concrete difference between CBP and more traditional forms of policing, it is that *CBP involves performance measures other than crime rates, arrest rates, and emergency response times.*⁴⁵ After documenting that the New York City police department has been doing well in recent years in relation to such conventional performance measures as crime rates, arrest rates, and emergency response times, George L. Kelling keenly observes:

But New Yorkers are not the least bit reassured by these statistical and relative achievements.... These formal measures of police work have little to do with community needs.... [A] significant reason disorder has been ignored is that professional criminal justice ideology narrowly defines the appropriate business of police and criminal justice agencies as dealing with serious crime.... Disorder does not appear in any FBI index; therefore, it has not been a priority.⁴⁶

Kelling's point is *not* that crime rates, arrest rates, emergency response times, and other conventional measures of police performance are unimportant or should be abandoned. Nor is his point that police matter not at all to the incidence and severity of crime. Rather, as one of Kelling's frequent co-authors, James Q. Wilson, has argued:

It is true that the prevalence and severity of crime in society do not depend mainly on what police and other justice practitioners do. But the real question is: What feasible changes in what institutions and practices will make the largest marginal changes in crime rates?⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Mark H. Moore and Geoffrey Alpert, "Measuring Police Performance," in John J. DiIulio *et al.*, *Justice System Performance Measures*, Princeton University-Bureau of Justice Statistics Discussion Series, forthcoming.

⁴⁶ George L. Kelling, "Measuring What Matters: A New way of Thinking About Crime and Public Order," *The City Journal*, Spring 1992, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁷ Quoted in John J. DiIulio, Jr., *Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: Toward A New Paradigm* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992), p. 3.

Before one can evaluate the potential of CBP as a way of reducing crime or achieving other desirable objectives, there must be some agreed-upon definition of CBP. Defining CBP strictly in terms of police-performance measures enables one to begin to distinguish departments that do CBP from those that do not. If the police department in question does not in practice use personnel-evaluation measures other than crime rates, arrest rates, emergency response times, *etc.*, for police officers assigned to uniformed duty, then it is not doing CBP. If personnel decisions (retention, promotion) are not, in practice, made according to criteria other than the conventional ones, then the department is not doing CBP.

By this definition, the usual "evidence" CBP is underway within a department -- rhetorical commitments by top police administrators, anecdotes about police "solving problems" rather than merely "reacting" to them, new organization charts boasting of "flattened police hierarchies," increases in the fraction of officers on foot patrol as opposed to auto patrol, more frequent police-sponsored meetings with community groups, and such -- is of secondary importance. The question is whether officers are or are not actually evaluated, rewarded, and punished for getting out of their cars, interacting with community leaders, and so on. Where they are, CBP exists. Where they are not, where the actual evaluation tools are the conventional ones -- arrests made, tickets issued, *etc.* -- then CBP does not exist, whatever the rhetoric or reputation of the department or its leaders.

Wesley G. Skogan has shown there is a high degree of consensus across demographic categories as to what citizens mean when they say they want to live and work in a safe, orderly neighborhood.⁴⁸ The short list includes:

- Streets free of drug dealers
- No rowdy teenagers
- No threatening derelicts
- No soliciting prostitutes
- No predatory criminals
- Buildings without graffiti
- No drive-by shootings

If CBP means anything, it must mean police take the production of safer, more orderly neighborhoods as their primary goal, and are evaluated accordingly. To do this, police must adopt micro-level measures of performance that are related to the goal of improving the safety and order of the neighborhoods. Examples of such micro-level measures might include the following:⁴⁹

- Tracking calls for service from a specific address or its immediate neighbors;
- Hiring a resident to make regular observations of life on the street by, for example, at stated intervals, counting the number of panhandlers, suspected drug dealers, sleeping vagrants, soliciting prostitutes, and so on; and,

⁴⁸ Wesley G. Skogan, *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods* (University of California Press, 1990).

⁴⁹ James Q. Wilson, "Defining Agency Success," in John J. DiIulio, Jr. *et al.*, *Justice System Performance Measures*, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics Discussion Series, forthcoming.

- Conducting a telephone survey of residents (using random-digit dialing to minimize sample selection costs) to assess their perceptions before and after the CBP activities.

Micro-level measures of police performance may well lead to conclusions quite at variance with city-wide aggregate data. For example, the "crime rate" might be getting worse at the same time the conditions of life in neighborhoods have measurably improved, or vice versa. But if CBP is to mean anything in practice, it must mean the police are engaged in the following activities:

- Identifying problems relevant to citizen concerns at the neighborhood level;
- Specifying possible solutions to these problems; and,
- Measuring the effect of policing strategies intended to meet these problems.

Like the comparable reports of other big cities, the City of Milwaukee's annual public safety reports do not merely summarize aggregate data on crime. Crime data are also summarized by police districts, census tracts, and by other geographic units (in the case of Milwaukee, by aldermanic districts).⁵⁰ But these crime data do *not* get at the measures of safety and order that are central to CBP, and police districts and census tracts are not neighborhoods. Wilson states the point about police performance measures bluntly:

[T]he search for better measures of police performance is doomed to failure so long as it focuses on city-wide or even precinct-wide statistics... No matter how we improve the Uniform Crime Reports [UCR] or the National Crime Victimization Survey [NCVS],⁵¹ they will not tell us very much [and certainly not very much in a timely fashion] about what difference the police make in the lives of citizens.⁵²

CBP: Increasing Police Manpower -- The Case of Milwaukee

But adopting new measures of police performance is only part of what must be done to implement CBP and give it a meaningful trial. Even with new performance measures, it is foolish to expect big-city police departments to make more than cosmetic changes in the way they operate unless they have sufficient manpower to expand patrols,

⁵⁰ For example, see *City of Milwaukee, 1991 Public Safety Report*, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Research Services, Appendices C through E, pp. 59-87.

⁵¹ These are the two most widely used measures of crime in the United States. The UCR is compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from state and local police reports. UCR data are used in most police department annual reports, including Milwaukee's. The NCVS is produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The annual NCVS reports contain data derived from continuing surveys of occupants of a representative sample of housing units in the United States. In the 1990 NCVS report, for example, about 95,000 people 12 years of age or older living in 47,000 households were interviewed, and 97% of the households selected to participate did so. There is some disagreement over which crime measures, the UCR's or the NCVS's, best reflect the actual level and composition of crime in the United States. One special virtue of the NCVS is that it picks up unreported crime. But self-report surveys of prisoners conducted in Wisconsin, New Jersey, and other states indicate even the NCVS may understate the actual amount of unreported crime. The UCR and the NCVS often differ as to crime trends. For example, NCVS data indicate violent crime declined between 1980 and 1990 nationwide (from 31 to 29.6 victimizations per 1,000 persons 12 years of age or older); UCR data indicate violent crime increased nationwide between 1980 and 1990 (from 597 to 634 violent crimes per 100,000 resident population).

⁵² Wilson, "Defining Agency Success," in DiIulio *et al.*, *Justice System Performance Measures*, *supra* note 45.

take on new, community-oriented functions, and so on. *CBP is not a do-more-with-less strategy, it is a do-more-with-more strategy.* Some proponents of CBP push the strategy as if it were a cost-saving cure-all for what ails big-city police departments and the places they protect and serve. "Community-based" has become a mantra in the field of criminal justice. But we now know so-called intensive, community-based correctional programs do not cut costs, they raise them, precisely as one would expect from programs reducing the ratio of clients to agents.⁵³ By the same token, CBP demands officers interact more closely and personally with more citizens. It is likely, therefore, to require more police manpower and cost more than conventional policing.

Consider, for example, the case of crime and policing in Milwaukee. There can be little question crime rates have soared over the last few decades, and that some areas of the city are far more crime-ridden than others. And there is reason for concern that, with or without CBP, Milwaukee may have fewer police officers than it needs.

A 1992 statistical analysis by George B. Palermo and others revealed crime rates in Milwaukee soared between 1965 and 1990, even as the city's population dropped from 741,000 to 628,000.⁵⁴ Table 2 on the next page summarizes the trends analyzed in the study. From 1965 to 1990, Milwaukee experienced sharp increases in homicides (511%) rapes (1712%), robberies (1990%), and assaults (217%).

⁵³ For example, see the reports on community-based intensive supervision programs by Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner, *Intensive Supervision for High-Risk Probationers* (Rand, 1990), and "Focusing on High-Risk Parolees," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 29 (February 1992), pp. 34-61. They found intensive community-based supervision was 1.7 times more expensive than routine parole.

⁵⁴ George B. Palermo and others, "Soaring Crime in a Midwestern American City: A Statistical Analysis," *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, vol. 36, 1992, pp. 291-303.

TABLE 2 Crimes Reported to the Police in Milwaukee, 1965-1990
Number and % change from previous year

Year	Homicide Number/%	Rape Number/%	Robbery Number/%	Assault Number/%
1965	27	33	214	477
1971	50/85	93/182	649/203	720/51
1974	62/24	196/111	1647/154	827/15
1975	69/11	146/-26	1968/19	1020/23
1979	63/-9	283/94	1592/-19	1101/8
1980	74/18	213/-25	1796/13	1227/11
1981	76/3	296/39	1894/6	1272/4
1982	70/-8	200/-32	2218/17	1272/0
1983	54/-23	243/22	2297/4	1251/-2
1984	48/-11	310/28	2118/-8	1274/2
1985	73/52	426/37	2271/7	1519/19
1986	85/16	520/22	2427/7	3450/127
1987	95/12	487/-6	2178/-10	3524/2
1988	86/-10	492/1	2302/6	2450/-30
1989	116/35	618/26	2602/13	1233/-50
1990	165/42	598/-3	4472/72	1513/23
% Change from 1965 to 1990				
	Homicide	Rape	Robbery	Assault
	+511%	+1712%	+1990%	+217%

Source: Adapted from George B. Palermo and others, "Soaring Crime in a Midwestern City: A Statistical Analysis," *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, vol. 36, 1992, p. 296.

There were some sharp declines in crime rates between 1965 and 1990. For example, between 1981 and 1984, homicides dropped 58%, and between 1965 and 1988, assaults dropped 65%. But the upward trend in the city's crime rates is unmistakable.

Data on Milwaukee provided in the *City of Milwaukee 1992 Public Safety Report* indicate that between 1991 and 1992, violent crimes increased 5.8%, while property crimes decreased 3.8%.⁵⁵ Between 1982 and 1992, the number of violent crimes in Milwaukee increased from 3,760 to 7,291, while the number of property crimes increased from 42,717 to 50,065.

Milwaukee's crime problem has been, and continues to be, far more severe in some parts of the city than in others. For example, Table 3 on the next page compares 1991 rates of reported crimes in six aldermanic districts in Milwaukee. In three of the aldermanic districts (Districts 1, 4, and 10), rates of reported crimes are higher than city averages; in three others (Districts 11, 13, and 15), rates are lower than average. In all cases, the differences between the district's rate and the city's rate are statistically significant. No one who knows the city will be surprised to learn the three higher-than-average crime areas are home to many poor and minority citizens, while the three lower-than-average crime areas have relatively few poor and minority citizens.

⁵⁵

City of Milwaukee 1992 Public Safety Report, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Research Services, p.

4.

TABLE 3 **Reported Crimes in Selected Milwaukee Aldermanic Districts, 1991**
Rates per 10,000 Population

Aldermanic District	Homicide	Assault	Robbery	Rape
1	7.4	49.2	115.8	18.2
4	7.2	37.8	176.4	22.0
10	9.5	87.7	189.3	26.1
11	0.3	1.9	6.5	1.1
13	0.0	2.8	9.7	1.7
15	0.2	7.2	34.5	4.6

Source: Adapted from *City of Milwaukee 1991 Public Safety Report, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission Research Services*, Appendix D, pp. 64, 67, 73, 74, 76, 78.

Of course, these data tell us nothing about the reasons for the increases or geographical variance in crime rates and hence nothing about how, if at all, the level or strategy of policing might have figured in these trends.⁵⁶ But they do underscore the reality that crime has been, and continues to be, a serious problem in Milwaukee and make it sensible to search for ways police might help to combat crime and disorder throughout the city, most especially in its most crime-ridden neighborhoods.

If having more officers on the beat matters either to the successful implementation of CBP or efforts to cut crime, or both, then there is some cause for concern. Table 4 below shows the number of officers per 1,000 residents in Milwaukee was steady for most of the 1980s at around 3.2, then fell to roughly 3 in 1991.

TABLE 4 **Officers Per 1,000 Residents in Selected Cities**

City	1983	1987	1991
Chicago	4.09	4.08	4.32
Baltimore	3.79	3.83	3.87
Atlanta	2.93	3.13	3.80
New York	3.29	3.78	3.65
MILWAUKEE	3.20	3.20	2.98
Denver	2.54	2.59	2.84
San Francisco	2.67	2.44	2.49
Albuquerque	1.67	1.91	2.04
Portland	1.85	1.97	1.84

Sources: Compiled from various reports of the Bureau of Justice Statistics by Margot Weisz in conjunction with work on John J. DiIulio, Jr. and Mark Alan Hughes, *Protection and Connection: A Mobility Strategy for Saving the Cities*, Brookings Institution, forthcoming.

⁵⁶ In "Soaring Crime in a Midwestern American City," *supra* note 54, Palermo and his co-authors offer a conventional criminological analysis relating the trends to unemployment, inadequate education, ineffective criminal rehabilitation, and other factors. Policing is not a variable in this study.

Note the figures related in Table 4 relate the total number of officers to the total population of the jurisdiction. But David Bayley has reported the average street-enforcement strength in New York City at any given time represents only 6.3% of the total force. In New York City, this amounts to 1,754 officers.⁵⁷ Bayley believes most big-city police departments are comparable to New York City in terms of the fractions of their total forces on the streets at any given moment. For the sake of argument, however, suppose even 20% of the total force -- a figure three times higher than Bayley's estimate -- was on the streets at any given time. Table 5 below adapts the 1991 numbers given in Table 4, using Bayley's estimate (rounded up from 6.3% to 6.5%) as a lower bound and 20% as an upper bound.

TABLE 5 Estimated Number of Officers on the Streets at Any Given Time, 1991

City (Population/Total Force)	Officers per 1,000 Residents			
	6.5% of Total Force	20% of Total Force	(6.5%)	(20%)
Chicago 2,811,478/12,132	788	2,462	.280	.863
Baltimore 748,099/2,893	188	579	.251	.774
Atlanta 403,085/1,533	100	307	.248	.761
New York 7,350,023/26,856	1,746*	5,371	.237	.730
MILWAUKEE 636,342/1,895	123	379	.193	.595
Denver 479,463/1,361	88	272	.183	.567
San Francisco 739,090/1,840	120	368	.162	.497
Albuquerque 393,148/803	52	161	.132	.409
Portland 449,671/829	54	166	.120	.369

* This number, 1,746, differs from Bayley's estimate of 1,754 given in the paragraph preceding Table 5 because Bayley's estimate is drawn from a slightly higher estimate of the city's total force (27,841) and uses 6.3% rather than 6.5%.

The simple arithmetic of Table 5 and its implications can be summarized by using the example of Milwaukee. In 1991, Milwaukee's total resident population was 636,342. Its total number of police officers was 1,895. This means that, as reported in Table 4,

⁵⁷ Bayley, "The Cop Fallacy," *supra* note 19.

there were 2.98 officers per 1,000 Milwaukee residents in 1991 (1,895 divided by 636,342 equals 2.98, divided by 1,000). But Bayley has observed that only a small fraction of any big-city police force is ever on the streets at any given time. He says the fraction runs as low as 6.5% of the total. Taking 6.5% of 1,895 (the total Milwaukee force in 1991) gives us 123. Taking a higher estimate of the fraction of the total force on the streets at any given time -- 20% -- gives us 379 (20% of 1,895). If 123 officers were on the streets of this city of 636,342 at any given time in 1991, there were only .193 officers on the streets per 1,000 residents in 1991 (123 divided by 636,342 equals .193, divided by 1,000). Likewise, if 379 officers were on the streets of this city of 636,342 at any given time in 1991, that means there were only .595 officers on the streets per 1,000 city residents in 1991 (379 divided by 636,342 equals .595, divided by 1,000). In other words, if Bayley's lower-bound estimate is used, then there was only about one-fifth of an officer on the streets at any given time in 1991 for every 1,000 city residents, or one officer for every 5,000 city residents. If the upper-bound estimate is used, then there was only about six-tenths of an officer on the streets at any given time in 1991 for every 1,000 city residents, or one officer for every 1,667 city residents.⁵⁸

One does not have to be a true believer in the potential benefits of saturation policing, CBP, or any combination of policing strategies and tactics to believe having so few officers spread so thinly on the streets relative to big-city populations is not likely to help bring safety and order to neighborhoods having high concentrations of crime and disorder.

An analysis of residential patterns in Milwaukee by Mark Alan Hughes reveals that in 1990, 55% the city's African-Americans lived in census tracts 80% or more black; so did most of the city's economically disadvantaged African-Americans (60%) and most of its unemployed African-Americans (57%).⁵⁹ Whether poverty causes crime, crime causes poverty, or both, no one should be surprised to find the city neighborhoods where impoverished minority citizens are concentrated are also the city neighborhoods where crime, disorder, and many other social ills are concentrated.⁶⁰

Whatever the future of CBP in Wisconsin, it is worth considering whether citizens who live in high-crime areas like certain neighborhoods in Milwaukee need more police to protect and serve them. *In Milwaukee and other big-city jurisdictions, to continue to discuss and promote CBP without confronting the possible need for more cops is irresponsible.* Ninety-seven percent of the Milwaukee police officers who responded to the survey noted in the previous section of this report said they thought "a larger police force" would help control crime.⁶¹

Most criminologists would doubt either a larger police force or greater concentrations of officers working within high-crime neighborhoods, or both, would make much of a difference. With or without CBP, it is worth finding out whether the rank-in-file cops or the academic analysts are right.

⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the Milwaukee Police Department was unwilling to provide data regarding the number of officers actually on the streets at any given time or on the precise deployment of officers as between high-crime and other areas of the city.

⁵⁹ DiIulio and Hughes, *Protection and Connection*, *supra* note 4.

⁶⁰ For a general discussion, see John J. DiIulio, Jr., "Underclass: The Impact of Inner-City Crime," *The Public Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 28-46.

⁶¹ Bothwell, "Tougher Approach Needed," *supra* note 32.

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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Wisconsin Policy Research Institute is a not-for-profit institute established to study public policy issues affecting the state of Wisconsin.

Under the new federalism, government policy increasingly is made at the state and local level. These public policy decisions affect the lives of every citizen in the state of Wisconsin. Our goal is to provide nonpartisan research on key issues that affect citizens living in Wisconsin so that their elected representatives are able to make informed decisions to improve the quality of life and future of the State.

Our major priority is to improve the accountability of Wisconsin's government. State and local government must be responsive to the citizens of Wisconsin in terms of the programs they devise and the tax money they spend. Accountability should be made available in every major area to which Wisconsin devotes the public's funds.

The agenda for the Institute's activities will direct attention and resources to study the following issues: education; welfare and social services; criminal justice; taxes and spending; and economic development.

We believe that the views of the citizens of Wisconsin should guide the decisions of government officials. To help accomplish this, we will conduct semi-annual public opinion polls that are structured to enable the citizens of Wisconsin to inform government officials about how they view major statewide issues. These polls will be disseminated through the media and be made available to the general public and to the legislative and executive branches of State government. It is essential that elected officials remember that all the programs established and all the money spent comes from the citizens of the State of Wisconsin and is made available through their taxes. Public policy should reflect the real needs and concerns of all the citizens of Wisconsin and not those of specific special interest groups.